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China: The role of rural-urban migration in economic development under 
capitalism* 
Roger Sandilands 
University of Strathclyde 
 
The transition to a market economy in China began in 1978 shortly after Mao’s death in 
1976, the imprisonment of the Gang of Four, and the rise of Deng Xiaoping. The Chinese 
command economy had been even more inefficient than in the Soviet Union, with mass 
starvation and death brought on by periodic lunacies such as the “Great Leap Forward”, 
aka the Great Leap Backward (1958-61), and the tumultuous Cultural Revolution that 
began in 1966 and finally ended only with Mao’s death. 
 
Deng Xiaoping set about improving China’s relations with the West (while remaining 
cool toward the Soviet Union) and gradually opening China to the outside world. From 
1986, the formal adoption of the “open-door policy” greatly accelerated trade and the 
related inflow of direct foreign investment1 and technology that Deng knew was essential 
for the more rapid development of China as an industrial nation. Also, peasants were 
offered material incentives under de-collectivisation and the Household Responsibility 
System by allowing them to earn extra income (over and above their share of collective 
produce) through sale of the produce of their private plots at market prices. The 
collectives, too, could sell surplus farm products on the open market. This liberalisation 
spurred a significant acceleration of the rate of growth of agricultural output available in 
exchange for industrial products. This represented and yielded a symbiotic market-led 
relationship between an agricultural and an industrial revolution.  
 
Managers of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were also given greater autonomy and 
incentives through various performance contracts, some more in tune with value added 
(rather than output regardless of inputs) than others (see Shirley and Xu, 1997). These 
performance contracts worked best, however, for SOEs that were more exposed to 
competition. Many were highly privileged giant monopolies, and their record on 
productivity has been poor.  
 
Political power remained with the central Communist Party bureaucracy that proclaimed 
that it was, in Deng’s words, “building Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, otherwise 
known as “market socialism”. Deng declared that socialism means eliminating poverty, 
but it seems that it has been the market rather than the socialism that has worked most of 
                                                 
* Prepared for the Centre for Research into Post-Communist Economies (CRCE) Colloquium on “The 
Future of Capitalism after the Collapse of Communism”, Kranj, Slovenia, 27-29 September 2007.  
   I am grateful to David Dollar for useful discussions of these issues at the World Bank in Beijing, June 
2007, and to Yongsheng Zhong at Renmin University where I was a Visiting Professor at this time.  
 
1 However, the capital account was not opened up more generally to portfolio flows. This helped insulate 
China from the worst fallout from the Asian crisis of 1997-99, though growth did suffer a small dip during 
this period. Due to her huge stock of dollar assets (official reserves currently stand at US$1.3 trillions) 
China may in some ways be less well placed to weather the financial stresses that currently afflict the 
United States. 
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the magic, if by socialism we mean micro-management of the economy with regulation 
and controls, and non-democratic, poorly accountable state ownership of enterprise.  
 
As is well known, China’s overall economic performance since it opened up has been 
breathtaking, surpassing even that of the four original “miracle” Asian Tigers. The World 
Bank (1994, tables 1 and 25) estimated 9.0 percent average annual growth of GDP (or 7.6 
percent per capita) from 1980-1992, and this rate accelerated slightly, to 10.0 percent per 
annum (or 9.0 percent per capita) from 1993-2006 (University of Beijing Statistical 
forum. www.zujee.com 2006). This means that in the post-reform era material living 
standards in China increased on average, albeit from a desperately low level, about 11-
fold. It should, however, be emphasised that this is an average. The distribution of the 
gains has been very uneven. 
 
It is a moot point whether a better distribution of income is more important than a more 
rapid reduction of absolute poverty. Ideally, the maximum rate of sustainable economic 
growth should be accompanied by a levelling up of low incomes toward the average. But 
when a country starts from an extremely low average, as China did from 1980,2 it is 
almost inevitable that for some time a minority will enjoy significantly greater gains from 
growth than the rest, and the distribution of income will worsen. The question is by how 
much and for how long a worsening can continue without engendering intolerable strains 
and resentments that threaten social stability and a reversal of economic gains.  
 
David Dollar, the World Bank’s country director for China, has recently (1997) addressed 
these concerns. Adopting US$1 a day at purchasing power parity3 as the conventional 
World Bank criterion of “absolute poverty”, Dollar shows that 25 years of strong growth 
has fueled a remarkable decline in absolute poverty from 64 percent at the beginning of 
the reform period to 10 percent in 2004. This means that more than half a billion people 
climbed out of absolute poverty, with around 640 millions in 1981 and around 130 
millions today. This is shown in Figure 1, from Dollar (2007) who updated a study by 
Ravallion and Chen (2004). The latter study suggested that, though the data could be 
suspect, as much as half of the decline in absolute poverty may have occurred in the early 
years of reform when poverty-stricken peasants were allowed to farm their own private 
plots and sell the produce at market prices. Revallion and Chen also showed that the 
proportion of households with income less than US$2.15 a day fell from 88.1 percent 
                                                 
2 However, while China had a reported per capita income in 1980 very similar to that of India – at around 
US$300 – her “human development” indices on education and health were significantly better than those of 
India, and later adjustments based on “purchasing power parity” raised China’s average per capita income 
by much more than India’s. China’s superior human capital (and her superior literacy rates had long 
historic roots stretching long before the Communist takeover in 1949) helped enable her to exploit more 
fully the opportunities that market reform opened up. The economic success of Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
post-1949, was, or should have been, a permanent embarrassment for Mao’s regime. 
3 This takes account of the relatively very high internal purchasing power of the renmimbi at the official 
exchange rate. A dollar will buy 4 pints of beer in Beijing! The hourly wage for ordinary labour in Beijing 
is about 25 US cents, or 2 RMB. A 60-hour working week is common, and work on many construction sites 
continues 24-7. (Also notable is that some university classrooms are in use for as much as 14 hours a day, 7 
days a week.)  
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(876 million persons) in 1981 to 46.7 percent (594 million persons) in 2001. Great 
progress but still a long way to go. 
 
 
Figure 1. GDP growth and poverty decline 
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The problem is that while great progress has been made in reducing absolute poverty, 
disparities have grown apace, and to a potentially dangerous degree. The overall Gini 
coefficient of inequality in household consumption increased from a low 0.31 (an 
equality of poverty) at the beginning of reform to a high 0.45 in 2004 (Dollar, 2007, p.8). 
Inequality in important social outcomes such as health status and educational attainment 
also increased markedly. Why is this and what can be done to improve distribution 
without slowing the rate at which absolute poverty is eliminated? 
 
The main clue comes from data on the gap between rural and urban incomes. For a 
country with China’s average per capita income, the proportion of the population living 
and working in rural areas is abnormally high – much higher than countries at 
comparable levels of development. Sicular et al (2007, p.106) report that in1990 the 
urban population was only 26.4 percent of the total, and that even by 2002 this had risen 
to 39.0 percent (and 40 percent by 2005: World Bank, 2007, Table 3.10).4  
 
The relatively low degree of urbanisation in China is reflected in one of the largest gaps 
between rural and urban per capita incomes in the world. Choi (2000) estimated that the 
 
4 These urban percentages may be compared with the following countries whose average per capita income 
in PPP terms was significantly lower than China’s in 2005: Indonesia (48%), Egypt (43%), Nigeria (48%), 
Peru (73%) (World Bank, 2007). 
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gap widened strongly, with few interruptions, from a ratio of 2.1 in 1982 to 2.7 in 1995. 
According to data collected by Sicular et al (2007, p.113), the ratio was even higher: 3.11 
for 1995 rising to 3.18 for 2002. They note that the ratio is somewhat lower if 
adjustments are made for spatial differences in the cost of living, though this is offset by 
the fact that adjustments ought also to be made for subsidised public services such as 
education, health and housing are more available to urban than rural residents.  
 
Hukou restrictions on rural-urban migration 
 
Comparisons are also complicated because most estimates of the income gap are based on 
data that exclude unregistered migrants resident in urban areas. The Maoist pre-reform 
regime had a so-called hukou system that greatly restricted people’s geographic (hence 
occupational) mobility (see, for example, Wang and Zuo, 1999). Each person has a 
registration (hukou) in either a rural or an urban area, and this cannot be changed without 
the permission of the receiving jurisdiction. Dollar (2007, p.10) explains:  
In practice cities usually give registration to skilled people who have offers of 
employment, but have generally been unwilling to provide registration to migrants 
from the countryside, Nevertheless, the migrants are needed for economic 
development, and large numbers have in fact migrated. Many of these fall into the 
category of “floating population”. There are nearly 200 million rural residents who 
spend at least six months of the year working in urban areas (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Rural population is moving to cities
 
From this we can see that about 940 million persons, or 72 percent of the total population 
of China (about 1,300 millions in 2004), were registered in rural areas, but only about 
760 millions (58 percent) were mainly resident there. Figure 2 (from Dollar 2007) 
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indicates the growing relaxation of the hukou system, but it remains a significant 
constraint on migration. Urban workers without the urban hukou are still denied access to 
schools for their children, and to subsidised housing and healthcare.  
 
If we include the unregistered migrants resident in urban areas (some 160 millions in 
2004) this would somewhat narrow the urban-rural income gap. Sicular et al (2007, p. 
123) note, however, that if we allow for this there would only be a modest influence on 
the overall level of inequality in China because the lower between-group inequality is 
offset by higher within-group inequality. Migration increases inequality within urban 
areas by restraining the growth of the unskilled urban wage while established urban 
workers, with greater education, experience and skills – and an artificial degree of 
scarcity – enjoy more rapidly rising wages. Ronald McKinnon (2006) has a chart (Figure 
3 below) that shows the nominal growth of wages in Chinese manufacturing, 1994-2004. 
Deflated by the rate of inflation (68 percent over this period), we may deduce that the real 
wage rate rose by 78 percent during the same period as real GDP grew by 214 percent (or 
by about 190 percent in per capita terms. Thus it is clear that while Chinese wages grew 
rapidly, they did not grow as fast as output, which means that they were not growing by 
enough to help the distribution of urban income. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Nominal Manufacturing Wage Growth for US and China 1994-200. Source: McKinnon (2006) 
 
 
Dollar (2007, p. 11) argues, in defence of the hukou system, that “it should be noted that 
China’s urbanization so far has been a relatively orderly process. One does not see in 
China the kinds of slums and extreme poverty that exist throughout Asia, Latin America 
and Africa.” This is true; but to the extent that it limits the opportunities of the relatively 
poor rural population to move to better-paid employment, it contributes to the persistence 
of as many as 130 millions – hidden from urban eyes – still living in extreme poverty in 
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rural areas. (Rural incomes, incidentally, are enhanced significantly by remittances from 
migrant family members.) 
 
The fact is that only about 15 percent of China’s GDP originates from agriculture (see 
table 1),5 whereas about 60 percent of the population live in rural areas. Both of these 
percentages are bound to fall in the future toward the levels in developed countries (such 
as the USA, shown in the table with only 1.4% of its GDP from agriculture, and where 
only 2 percent of its workers are engaged in this sector), as the Green Revolution, still in 
its relative infancy in China, spreads throughout the land.  
 
 
 
Table 1 
 
 
Fortunately, there is a substantial amount of income that rural residents can and do earn 
from non-farm activities, and China is well known for its “factories in the fields”. In 
general, however, these rural enterprises do not enjoy the pervasive agglomeration 
economies that urban enterprises enjoy, and they do relatively little to bridge the glaring 
disparity between the percentage of GDP that is generated in rural areas and the 
percentage of the labour force employed (or unemployed, or underemployed) there. This 
disparity is, of course, the flip side of the urban-rural income gap. An efficient free 
market system is not only one where goods and services move freely from producer to 
consumer under competitive conditions. Fluid factor mobility is just as important, both 
for efficiency and for greater equality.   
 
Land and labour in country and city 
 
The factors of production are land, labour and capital. Land cannot move, though it can 
be put to ever-changing use, including from rural to urban use. Perhaps the greatest 
source of social unrest in China relates to the ways that peasants have been prevented 
                                                 
5 The data in Table 2 below suggest that the share of agriculture in China’s GDP fell below 15 percent 
around 2000, and that by 2006 its share had fallen to less than 12 percent.   
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from selling their private plots (held on long-term leases from the state), or have been 
dispossessed by large corporations and developers acting in league with corrupt local 
officials. As China’s cities expand, farmland once almost worthless is now in high 
demand for power plants, factories, or luxury housing.  
 
BBC correspondent Dan Griffiths reported (2 August 2005): 
Some estimates suggest that more than three million people were involved in 
demonstrations last year, and the government in Beijing is getting increasingly 
concerned… The Communist Party’s complete control over land allocation has led to 
corruption on an enormous scale. Power rests in the hands of party cadres, and 
corrupt officials can often act with impunity. They sometimes take over land to sell 
directly to developers, pocketing the profits. They also take bribes or cream off much 
of the compensation paid to those who are moved out of their homes. This abuse of 
authority in the pursuit of wealth is one of the dark sides of China’s economic 
miracle.6   
  
As the population of China’s cities grows apace, space does not. As demand for urban 
land increases, with supply fixed, the price trends strongly upwards. This implies large 
transfers of wealth from tenants to owners.7 This also encourages speculative land 
acquisition, which fuels unsustainable booms. Both real estate and stock markets have 
been booming in 2007, and it remains to be seen whether China will suffer the same fate 
as Japan in 1990-91, when both of these markets crashed violently, putting an end for 
more than a decade to Japan’s capitalist economic “miracle”. The storm clouds currently 
looming over the world economy, with origins in the US sub-prime mortgage market, 
may pose a particular threat to China, given her ever-closer economic ties to the US. 
 
Housing finance is central to China’s rapid structural transformation toward an urban-
industrial nation. To understand why the growth of cities, hence buoyant urban housing 
finance, is essential for the continuance of rapid overall economic growth, one has to 
examine the different income elasticities of demand for urban versus rural goods and 
services. With no particular change in the terms of trade (relative prices) between sectors, 
one can see, from Table 2, that between 1993-2006 the growth of supply and demand for 
mainly urban-based manufactured goods and services greatly outpaced the growth of 
supply and demand for agricultural produce.  
 
                                                 
6 Similar examples of corruption came to light recently in Shanxi province where owners of brick kilns had 
been kidnapping children and holding them as slave labourers, with the connivance of bribable local 
government officials. The other dark side of China’s development is official complacency over 
environmental degradation and pollution, with the coal-rich Shanxi province again one of the worst 
offenders, responsible for 90 percent of China’s sulphur dioxide emissions. The issue has been highlighted 
by Elizabeth Economy in The River Runs Black (2004). Meanwhile, in traffic-congested cities the number 
of cars is doubling every six or seven years (Beijing now has more than 3 million). Levels of airborne 
particulates are now six times higher in Beijing than in New York.  
7 All land in China is owned by the state, but transferable urban land-use rights are sold to individuals for 
periods between 40 and 70 years. As for rural land, this is “collectively” owned, but farmers are given 30-
year leases, often, however, without supporting documents. (See The Economist, March 10, 2007 for a 
discussion of the controversial new “Real Rights Law” on private property.)  
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GDP Agriculture Agricultur  Manufact  Manufact Service  GDP Service 
   1993 3533 688.7 1645.5 1199.2 14 4.7 19.9 12.1
1994 4820 947.1 2244.6 1628.1 13.1 4 18.4 11
1995 6079 1202 2868 2009.4 10.9 5 13.9 9.8
1996 7118 1388.6 3383.5 2345.6 10 5.1 12.1 9.4
1997 7897 1426.5 3754.3 2716.5 9.3 3.5 10.5 10.7
1998 8440 1461.8 3900.4 3078 7.8 3.5 8.9 8.3
1999 8968 1454.8 4103.4 3409.5 7.6 2.8 8.1 9.3
2000 9922 1471.6 4555.6 3894.3 8.4 2.4 9.4 9.7
2001 10966 1551.6 4951.2 4462.7 8.3 2.8 8.4 10.2
2002 12033 1623.9 5389.7 5019.7 9.1 2.9 9.8 10.4
2003 13582 1706.9 6243.6 5631.8 10 2.5 12.7 9.5
2004 15988 2095.6 7390.4 6501.8 10.1 6.3 11.1 10
2005 18309 2307 8704.7 7296.8 10.2 5.2 11.7 10
2006 21087 2477.4 11429 8177.7 11.1 5 13 11
Year GDP in billions of RMB Percentage Growth (real) yr‐on‐yr
 
Table 2: Source: University of Beijing Statistical forum: www.zujee.com, 2006. (Thanks to Ran Zhang (2007) 
for compiling this table.)  
From this table we can calculate that during 1993-2006 real GDP grew by an average of 
9.99 percent per year, agriculture by only 4.0 percent, manufacturing by 11.2 percent, and 
services by 7.4 percent. These differential trends in demand and supply are bound to 
continue. Thus rural workers will experience ever more powerful push (displacement by 
modern methods in agriculture) and pull (higher urban incomes) influences on them to 
migrate to escape rural poverty. An essential role in boosting this mobility of labour must 
be played by the housing finance system.             
 
Labour mobility and housing finance 
 
The system must be both dynamic and sustainable, avoiding the mistakes of Japan in the 
late 1980s and in the USA and elsewhere today. In China about 68 percent of all 
mortgages are provided by the four large state-owned banks, a further 19 percent by other 
banks. The rest (about 13 percent) is mainly provided by housing provident funds (HPFs), 
mostly available only for employees of state-owned enterprises.8 From a low base of 
about 3.4 percent of GDP in 2000, the value of the stock of outstanding mortgage loans in 
China nearly tripled to 10 percent in 2005. This is a remarkable pace of expansion but the 
level is still below other developing countries such as Malaysia (24%), Chile and 
                                                 
8 Information on housing finance is from Loïc Chiquier (2006) who relied partly on a provisional 
September 2006 document drawn up by the Financial and Private Sector Development Department, East 
Asia and Pacific Region, the World Bank that David Dollar kindly made available to me, and that I have 
also drawn upon here.  
 8
Thailand (16%), and much below developed countries such as the US (65%) and the EU 
(45%). It is also still a relatively small proportion of overall bank balance sheets (about 9 
percent in 2005). In Singapore, where 90 percent of households became owner-occupiers 
within 25 years of her becoming an independent Republic in 1965, much greater reliance 
was had on their Central Providend Fund (CPF) to finance mortgages. There the 
compulsory CPF pension contributions peaked at 50 percent of all gross wages and 
salaries by the mid-1980s, and the government permits most of these to be withdrawn for 
use as down-payments and monthly servicing charges. As a result residential construction 
became a dynamic ‘leading sector’, along with exports, in the Republic’s phenomenal, 
sustained economic growth over four decades.9     
 
Thus in China there is still plenty of scope for continuing rapid expansion of lending for 
residential construction by banks and HPFs.10 Prudent regulation is essential, however. In 
2006, alarmed at the rise in the ratio of house prices to average incomes, along with rising 
loan-to-value (LTV) ratios, the government reduced the maximum LTV from 80% to 
70% as a way to preserve the quality of the increasing portfolio and hence the soundness 
of the banking system. Mortgage terms are mainly for 10-15 years, and only for new 
housing. This limits the potential demand, and these limits or restrictions could easily be 
relaxed as and when the availability of non-inflationary savings for the system is 
increased. Liquid bank deposits have not carried a very attractive real rate of interest for 
savers, and very recently the government has reduced the rate of tax on interest income to 
try to encourage saving while at the same time trying to restrain the inflationary growth 
of the money supply. To supplement retail deposits and, it is believed, as a way to spread 
risk, the government has also been experimenting with two pilot mortgage securitisation 
schemes. Again, the world is learning that close monitoring of such innovations is 
essential if securitisation is to reduce rather add to the risks associated with borrowing 
short to lend long – an essential feature of housing finance.   
 
The foreign sector 
 
Though fancy financial derivatives are relatively rare inside China, the Chinese 
government is itself heavily involved in foreign money markets, with more than US$1.3 
trillion in official foreign reserves.11 This reflects another dangerous interventionist 
practice on the part of the Chinese government, namely the maintenance, over a long 
period, of a highly undervalued exchange rate for the renmimbi against the US dollar. 
This has artificially cheapened Chinese exports in foreign markets so that despite heavy 
inward direct foreign investment (which normally generates a balance of trade deficit as 
                                                 
9 Singapore’s Housing Development Board and Urban Development Authority have played a significant 
role in recent years as advisers on urbanization in China, notably with respect to the development of the 
new city of Suzhou, near Shanghai. On the role of the CPF in Singapore’s massive housing programmes, 
see Sandilands (1992).   
10 China’s HPFs are partly modeled on the Singaporean system, but the coverage is far less, and there are 
more than 300 different HPFs throughout the country, operated by large SOEs or local authorities. Their 
portfolios are therefore highly concentrated locally, hence subject to greater risk of local economic 
downturns. This risk would be reduced if they were to be consolidated into a few larger regional funds. 
11 The Financial Times, August 24, 2007, reported that the state-owned Bank of China had revealed it held 
nearly US$10 billion in securities backed by US sub-prime mortgages. 
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foreign firms first import raw materials and components parts before exporting the value 
added) there has been a prolonged period with large balance of trade surpluses. The 
allocation of resources has therefore been heavily and artificially skewed toward exports. 
China has become very heavily dependent on international trade to keep its economy on 
the move. With a smaller economy than that of the US, its export-to-GDP ratio stands at 
36.8%12, compared with only about 12% for the US (and a mere 4% for China at the 
beginning of the reform period in the early 1980s). Exports to the US account for 8.6% of 
GDP, with a similar amount going to the EU, so China is critically dependent on the 
continuance of buoyant growth in those economies, which cannot be relied upon. This is 
how Jim Walker (once a student of mine, now chief economist at CLSA) summarised the 
dangers earlier this month: 
- Its domestic supply is desperately out of sync with domestic demand because 
China has built an industrial structure that is crucially dependent on global demand 
growing above trend. The current account surplus is now a whopping 12.1% 
(forecast) and 12.4% for next year. Real retail sales are trending down which is 
why the external surplus is trending up.  
- Exports grew by 28% in first 7 months of 2007, with a surge of 37% to Europe 
(whose share of Chinese exports is now 20%, slightly above the share going to the 
US). Unlikely to be sustainable as US and European growth falters. Japan’s share 
has dropped to 8.5%. Credit squeezes in US and Europe will be bad news for the 
40% of Chinese exports going there. 
  
In November 2001 China finally was allowed to join the World Trade organisation after 
agreeing to reduce its own trade barriers. Her average tariff was reduced from about 40% 
to 10%. But she has had a current account surplus in all but 7 years since 1980, and the 
chronic undervaluation of her currency has more than offset the liberalisation of trade 
during this period. A strong case could be made for invoking the Bretton Woods “scarce 
currency clause” against China in these circumstances, though the US can also be blamed 
for running persistent and large fiscal deficits that she has allowed to be financed to a 
substantial degree by selling Treasury bills to the Chinese. The US threat to discriminate 
against Chinese imports constantly runs against the fear that China might retaliate by 
selling her huge stock of Treasuries, though at the same time the Chinese must fear that 
such a move would so depreciate the dollar as to devalue their foreign reserves. 
Nonetheless, an accelerated appreciation of the renmimbi would reduce import costs for 
Chinese consumers and so boost their wealth, permitting a desirable increase in domestic 
purchasing power – including toward housing – that would reorient production in those 
directions.    
 
A concluding personal note 
 
I was invited as a Visiting Professor to Renmin (the People’s) University in Beijing this 
summer to lecture to their students on the classical theory of economic growth as 
pioneered by Adam Smith, Allyn Young (1856-1929), and Xiaokai Yang (1949-2004). 
These three were great advocates of the essential role of natural liberty in the growth 
process, with stress on competition, mobility, and free domestic and international trade. 
                                                 
12 Credit Lyonnais Securities (Asia) (CLSA), Triple-A bulletin, September 5, 2007. 
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Their key common aphorism was that “specialisation or the division of labour is limited 
by the size of the market”. Thus competition and openness were the key policy 
implications. Xiaokai Yang was arrested during the Cultural Revolution, at the age of 18, 
for daring to write a pamphlet criticising Maoism and spent 10 years in gaol. He used his 
time there wisely and on his release in 1977 was able to sail through a degree in 
economics that earned him a scholarship to Princeton. He subsequently developed the 
implications of Allyn Young’s famous presidential address to the British Association on 
“Increasing returns and economic progress” (Young, 1928) in many books and journal 
articles (e.g., Yang, 2004). These prompted Nobel Laureate James Buchanan to nominate 
Yang for a Nobel prize. Yang’s untimely death in 2004 prevented him from receiving the 
recognition he deserved. But it is pleasingly ironic and encouraging that Yang’s 
passionate pleas for greater economic and political freedom led his students to set up a 
centre to promote his ideas at Renmin (“The People’s”) University that proudly proclaims 
that it was the first university established by the Communists (in 1947).    
    
 11
 12
References 
Chiquier, Loïc (2006, December), Housing Finance in East Asia. Mimeo, World Bank, 
December. (www.ifc.org). 
Choi, Songsu (2000), Agenda for China’s Urbanisation Policy: Economic Mobility and 
Integration. Mimeo, Beijing: World Bank Urbanisation Workshop. 
Dollar, David (2007), Poverty, inequality and social disparities during China’s economic 
reform. Mimeo, World Bank, Beijing, April 2007. 
Economy, Elizabeth C. (2004), The River Runs Black: The environmental challenge to 
China’s future. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.  
McKinnon, Ronald (2006), “China’s Exchange Rate Trap: Japan Redux”, American 
Economic Review, 96:2, 427-431. 
Shirley, Mary and Lixin Colin Lu (1997), Empirical effects of performance contracts: 
Evidence from China. World Bank, Development Research Group, Washington, D.C. 
Ravallion, Martin and Shaohua Chen (2004), China’s (uneven) progress against poverty. 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3408. 
Sandilands, Roger J. (1992), "Savings, Investment and Housing in Singapore's Growth, 
1965-90", Savings and Development, XVI:2, pp.119-44. 
Wang, Feng and Xuejin Zuo (1999), Inside China’s Cities: Institutional barriers and 
opportunities for urban migrants”, American Economic Review (May), pp.276-80. 
World Bank (2007), World Development Indicators, 2007. Washington DC: World Bank. 
Yang, Xiaokai (2003), Economic Development and the Division of Labour. Oxford: 
Blackwells. 
 
Young, Allyn A. (1928), “Increasing returns and economic progress”, Economic Journal, 
38, pp.527-42. 
 
Zhang, Ran (2007), A Critical Review and Analysis of the Chinese Foreign Exchange 
Rate. MSc dissertation, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow.  
